Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects by Senik, Claudia
www.ssoar.info
Direct evidence on income comparisons and their
welfare effects
Senik, Claudia
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Senik, C. (2009). Direct evidence on income comparisons and their welfare effects. Journal of Economic Behavior &
Organization, 72(1), 408–424. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.019
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-293675
Accepted Manuscript
Title: Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons and their
Welfare Effects
Author: Claudia Senik
PII: S0167-2681(09)00124-3
DOI: doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.019
Reference: JEBO 2383
To appear in: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Received date: 3-10-2007
Revised date: 24-4-2009
Accepted date: 24-4-2009
Please cite this article as: Senik, C., Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons
and their Welfare Effects, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2008),
doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.019
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication.
As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript.
The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof
before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that
apply to the journal pertain.
Page 1 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons and their Welfare 
Effects 
First version October 4th, 2007 
This version September 22, 2008 
Claudia Senik* 
Paris School of Economics 
 
Summary 
This paper provides direct evidence that comparisons exert a significant effect on subjective 
well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types of benchmarks. Internal 
comparisons to one’s own past living standard outweigh any other comparison benchmarks. 
Local comparisons (to one’s parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more 
powerful than self-ranking in the social ladder. The impact of comparisons is asymmetric: 
under-performing one’s benchmark always has a greater welfare effect than out-performing it 
(in absolute value). Comparisons which reduce satisfaction also increase the demand for 
income redistribution, but there, the relative impact of subjective ranking is preponderant.  
Key words: subjective well-being, income comparisons, demand for income redistribution, 
internal and external benchmarks, Transition. 
JEL classification: C25, D31, D63, I31, J31, O57, P3, Z13 
* also PSE (UMR CNRS, EHESS, ENPC, ENS), Université Paris-Sorbonne, Institut 
Universitaire de France and IZA  
 
PSE, 48, bd Jourdan, 75014 Paris, France 
Tel:  33-1-43-13-63-12 
e-mail: senik@pse.ens.fr  
web: http://www.pse.ens.fr/senik 
 
I thank participants to the “labor market and inequality” seminar at the Paris School of 
Economics. I am grateful to Pierre-Thomas Leger and two anonymous referees for useful 
comments. This research has benefited from the financial support of the CEPREMAP. The 
usual disclaimer applies. 
* Title Page (with Full Author Details)
Page 2 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Direct Evidence on Income Comparisons and their Welfare 
Effects
First version October 4th, 2007
This version April 10, 2009
Summary
This paper provides direct evidence that income comparisons exert a significant impact on 
subjective well-being. It also evaluates the relative importance of different types of 
benchmarks. Internal comparisons to one’s own past living standard outweigh any other
comparison benchmarks. Local comparisons (to one’s parents, former colleagues or high-
school mates) are more powerful than self-ranking in the social ladder. The impact of 
comparisons is asymmetric: under-performing one’s benchmark always has a greater welfare 
effect than out-performing it (in absolute value). Comparisons which reduce satisfaction also 
increase the demand for income redistribution, but there, the relative impact of subjective 
ranking is preponderant. 
Key words: subjective well-being, income comparisons, demand for income redistribution, 
internal and external benchmarks, Transition.
JEL classification: C25, D31, D63, I31, J31, O57, P3, Z13
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
Page 3 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
2
1. Introduction 
Is income utility relative, and if so relative to what and how important are the welfare effects 
of comparisons?  The “discrepancy” of “relative utility” theory is quite influential among 
economists and psychologists (e.g. Michalos, 1985). The general idea is that individuals 
compare themselves to a series of standards. Satisfaction judgements then depend on the gap 
between their actual situation and their comparison benchmarks. The most important 
implication of relative utility is that increasing the income of all does not increase the 
happiness of all (Easterlin, 1974, 1995, 2001), which questions the relevance of National 
Income as an objective of economic policy. 
An important share of the happiness literature is dedicated to the identification of thresholds 
in the welfare function of income (or consumption). Essentially, comparators can be of two 
types: (i) “external benchmarks”, i.e. relevant others, such as former schoolmates, colleagues, 
neighbors, parents, and (ii) “internal norms” or “internal benchmarks”, which involve 
aspirations and dynamic comparisons with one’s own income in different points of time. 
Hedonic treadmill, habituation and adaptation are the consequences of the second type of 
comparisons. Of course internal norms are certainly influenced by external benchmarks so 
that the distinction is not clear-cut. Some authors have also argued that individuals’ well-
being depends essentially on their ordinal ranks within a group rather than on relative income 
(Brown et al., 2008).
In spite of the popularity of the concept of relative income in social science, there is not much 
direct evidence to date about those whom people really compare themselves to. Most of the 
time, the evidence about comparisons is indirect. In the bulk of the corpus, which is based on
survey data, researchers usually have to decide for themselves how to delimit the reference 
groups, and then verify that the “reference income” that they have constructed does have 
some statistical influence on the variable of interest. This is because surveys usually contain 
no direct questions about the composition of reference groups.
Following this general method, some papers have hypothesized that comparisons are made 
with respect to neighbors. In essence, the authors define the reference group as the inhabitants 
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of the geographical area where the respondent lives. They calculate the typical income inside 
this group and include this calculated variable in the regression of happiness, together with 
the individual income of the respondent. The scope of the geographical reference varies, from 
being as large as East and West Germany (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005) or American States 
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), to smaller areas such as the primary census units of the 
American National Survey of Families and Households (Luttmer, 2005) or the census tract of 
the Canadian General Social Survey (Helliwell and Huang, 2005). 
Certain authors defined reference groups as being composed of people with whom one has 
daily interactions, such as family members and friends (MacBride, 2001). Others elicit 
colleagues or people exerting the same profession as being the relevant others, in particular 
concerning job satisfaction (Cappelli and Sherer, 1988, Clark and Oswald, 1996, Brown et al., 
2008, Senik, 2004, 2008). The demonstrandum of these articles is precisely to show that the 
reference group that they have picked up is relevant and that its average income does exert a 
significant (negative or positive) effect on satisfaction.
Of course, the identification of “internal benchmarks” is an easier task. Basically, researchers 
model the dependence of current satisfaction over lagged periods of income. The question is 
then whether, because of adaptation effects and rising aspirations, past levels of income or 
consumption exert a negative influence on current satisfaction. The Leyden school has made 
an inaugural contribution in this field by illustrating the existence of a “preference drift” in 
income satisfaction (see van Praag, 1971 or van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2004). They 
estimate that about 60% of the satisfaction associated with a rise in a person’s income 
evaporates due to a change in her aspirations. More classical studies of life satisfaction based 
on panel household surveys mostly confirm the presence of adaptation effects. Moreover, they 
stress the importance of contrast effects, i.e. of variation in income rather than level of 
income, as suggested by the prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Studies in 
income adaptation and aspirations include Clark (1999), Clark, Diener, Georgellis and Lucas 
(2008), Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald. (2003) and Stutzer (2004).
However, the type of evidence provided by these studies remains indirect: the benchmark is 
chosen by the researcher and injected in the satisfaction regression; the assumption that the 
variable is capturing a comparison benchmark remains an interpretation. Two exceptions are
Melenberg (1992) and Knight and Song (2006). Melenberg used two waves of the Dutch 
Socio-Economic Panel data in which individuals were asked about “the people whom they 
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meet frequently”. Following the method of the Leyden school based on the “Minimum 
Income Question”, he showed that the aspirations of individuals are increasing in the average 
income of their social network. Knight and Song used a survey of Chinese households and 
showed that when asked explicitly to whom they compare themselves, 68% of survey 
respondents report that their main comparison group consists of individuals in their own 
village. In summary, displaying some direct evidence about the composition of people’s 
reference groups largely remains a challenge that lies ahead of the blooming literature 
dedicated to comparisons and adaptation. 
This paper is one of the first studies that try not only to provide direct evidence of 
comparisons, but also to assess the relative impact of various types of comparisons, including 
subjective ranking on a social ladder. It also analyzes the relation between income
comparisons and the ensuing demand for redistribution. The literature dedicated to this issue 
has put in evidence the role of self-centered motives such as being a potential recipient of 
transfers (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote, 2001), risk-aversion (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2000) 
and expected mobility based on past experienced mobility (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Alesina 
and la Ferrara, 2005); the data offers the opportunity to verify whether relative deprivation 
and relative performance also exerts an impact on individuals’ attitudes towards income 
redistribution.
This paper relies on the Life in Transition Survey (LITS), a cross-section representative 
survey of households of all countries of the former socialist bloc. Starting in 1990, Transition 
countries have been undergoing a process of deep restructuring, leading to the transformation 
from an administered economy to a market economy, and in many cases from an authoritarian 
regime to a democracy. The Life in Transition Survey is an investigation into the perception of 
this transformation by the inhabitants of these countries. An important number of questions 
explicitly ask people to compare their economic and political situation in 2006 with respect to 
the pre-Transition period (i.e. before 1989). More specifically, respondents are asked to 
compare their current living standard with the pre-transition period, or with that of their 
parents, of their former colleagues, and of their former schoolmates. Two other questions ask 
respondents to place themselves on a subjective economic ladder reflecting their current 
situation in 2006 and their past situation back in 1989.
I use this survey in order to evaluate the relevance and the relative importance of the different 
comparison benchmarks suggested by the aforementioned questions. I start from the idea that 
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there is no a priori reason why some people should estimate that they have done better than 
their colleagues but worse than their former high school mates, or better then their parents but 
worse than in 1989. Looking at the effect of such opposite evolutions in different dimensions 
thus helps to avoid the risk of collinearity of comparison benchmarks due to omitted 
variables. I thus map the different modalities of each pair of variables, creating a series of 
interaction terms that constitute a total partition of the sample. I estimate Life Satisfaction on 
these interaction categories, controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables and for 
country dummies. Finally, I also look at the impact of comparisons on the demand for income 
redistribution. 
The results show that comparisons are relevant and exert a significant impact on subjective 
well-being. Comparisons are asymmetric: under-performing one’s benchmark is always more 
important than out-performing it. A clear ranking also emerges among the type of interactions 
that are being analyzed: “intra-personal” comparisons are more important than inter-personal 
ones. Local comparisons (to parents, former colleagues or high school mates) are more 
powerful than general ranking in the social ladder and its evolution. Comparisons that affect 
subjective well-being trigger a “compensating” demand for redistribution, but the relative 
importance of comparison benchmarks is different, as self-ranking on a general affluence 
scale is the most important determinant of the demand for redistribution.
The next section presents the LITS survey. Section 3 presents the method, section 4 the 
results and the last section concludes.
2. Data
The study hinges on the Life in Transition Survey (see EBRD, 2007), a survey conducted by 
the EBRD in 2006, in 28 post-Transition countries (plus Turkey). Respondents to the survey 
were drawn randomly, using a two stage sampling method, with census enumeration areas as 
primary sampling units, and households as secondary sampling units. The survey includes 
1000 observations per country, for a total of 29002 observations. The sample is equally 
balanced in terms of gender, but is biased in favor of elder people, with a means of 50 years 
for respondents A and 46 years old for respondent B (see lower).
The main attitudinal questions that are exploited in this paper are labeled in the following 
way: 
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“To what extend do you agree with the following statements: 
- I have done better in life than most of my high school mates.
- I have done better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989.
- I have done better in life than my parents.
- My household lives better nowadays than around 1989.
- All things considered, I am satisfied with my life now (henceforth Life satisfaction). 
- The gap between the rich and the poor today in this country should be reduced .
For each separate question, respondents had to tick one answer out of seven proposed 
modalities: “strongly disagree/disagree/neither disagree nor agree/agree/strongly agree/not 
applicable/don’t know”.
Two other comparison questions were asked:
- “Please imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the 
poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step of the 
ten is your household today?”
- “Now imagine the same ten-st p ladder around 1989, on which step was your 
household at that time?”
As the main questions of interest concern comparisons between 2006 and 1989, I restricted 
the sample to respondents aged over 40 years old, who were thus born before 1965 and were 
at least 24 years old in 1989, at the very start of the reform period; this implies an loss of 
12020 observations (out of 29002).
Regrettably (in my view) the survey asks a first series of general questions concerning the 
household to a first respondent (respondent A), including the two “subjective ranking” 
questions above, and then asks all the other questions to the “last birthday person” in the 
household (respondent B). In many cases, it fortunately turned out that the same person 
actually answered all the questions, so that respondent A = respondent B. When it is not the 
case, it would be questionable to treat the answers of respondent A and respondent B as being 
associated with the same observation. Of course, this concerns only the two “subjective 
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ranking” questions above-mentioned, which are relative to the standard of living of the 
household and not to the individual himself. This may attenuate the problem, conditional on 
the fact that the household is still the same in 2006 as it was in 1989. However, to be safe, I 
take a conservative approach, which consists in keeping only the observations if respondent A 
and respondent B are the same person. This involves an additional loss of 4796 observations.  
Eventually, the regressions are run on sample of 11876 observations for 28 countries, leaving 
aside Turkey. This restriction does not involve noticeable change in the composition of the 
sample; the average age of the respondent is slightly higher (58.6 instead of 57.8) and the 
proportion of men higher (50% instead of 46%) in the final sample, but the mean household 
income is about the same. The descriptive statistics presented in the Appendix are based on 
the restricted sample.
In the (restricted) sample, the average level of life satisfaction was 2.93 (on a 5 steps ladder). 
Mean subjective ranking was 3.94 in 2006 against 5.57 in 1989 (on a 10 steps ladder) . Only 
27% of respondents judged that they lived better than in 1989, against 52% who estimated 
that they lived worse; 28% estimated that they had done better than their former high school 
mates, 26% than their former colleagues and 52% better than their parents. Only 16% of the 
respondents placed themselves above the fifth step of the social ladder in 2006. Finally, 85% 
of the retained sample agreed or strongly agreed that the gap between the rich and the poor 
should be reduced. This proportion was surprisingly similar across the different income 
groups1. Ravallion and Lokshin (2000) observed the same phenomenon in Russia and related 
it to the feeling of uncertainty in Transition societies.
                                                
1 In LITS, the standard of living is measured using a series of questions regarding household 
expenditure during the past 12 months on an exhaustive list of items including: food, 
beverages and tobacco, clothing and footwear, transport and communication, recreation and 
entertainment, education including tuition, books, kindergarten expenses), health (including 
health insurance), furnishings (sheets, towels, blankets, linen, etc.), household durable goods 
(e.g. furniture, household appliances, TV, car, etc.) and other items. All expenditures were
converted into a single currency (USD). I distinguished three groups of equal size, 
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3. Method 
The objective of the paper is to draw some causality from income comparisons to self-
declared life satisfaction, as well as demand for redistribution. The formulation of comparison 
questions in the survey allows avoiding two important caveats in the interpretation of 
subjective comparisons.
The first obstacle is the possible endogenous definition of reference groups. An important 
strand of the psychological literature has shown that reference groups can be chosen 
instrumentally as a motivation device (self-improvement) or a self-validation strategy (self-
enhancement) (see Diener and Lucas, 1999; Falk and Knell, 2004; Diener and Fujita, 1995). 
Some studies suggest that optimistic people only compare downward, whereas pessimistic 
people compare with more successful ones (Lyubomirski and Ross, 1997). The LITS partly 
addresses this issue by setting exogenously a list of proposed comparison benchmarks. Of 
course, the issue of memory bias remains in the sense that respondents can instrumentally 
“choose” to remember such or such former colleagues. But this is unavoidable as it is 
important to leave some discretion to respondents in order to be sure that they are comparing 
with groups of persons that are actually relevant to them.
The second obstacle is that comparisons certainly exert a different impact depending on the 
person’s initial economic background and trajectory. This is again due to the endogeneity of 
individual aspirations, against which one gauges his economic success. To take this into 
account, most comparison questions include a dynamic component as the surveyed persons 
are asked to compare their current economic “success” with that of past references, either 
their own situation around 1989, their parents, or the current situation of colleagues and 
schoolmates that they had before 1989. All these comparison benchmarks, except the 
                                                                                                                                                        
representing the richest, average and poorest third of the sample in term of real household 
consumption.
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respondent’s parents, are made of persons who occupied a similar position as the respondent’s 
around 1989. The comparison questions thus refer to a notion of race, with runners starting 
from the same place in 1989 and reaching more or less advanced positions in 2006. Even the 
subjective ladder question can be made dynamic by taking the difference between self-
ranking in 2006 and self-ranking in 1989.
The third and foremost obstacle to identifying causal relations between comparisons and life 
satisfaction is omitted variables and reverse causation. Those who estimate that they have 
done better in life than their former colleagues may just be “happier” persons: they may have 
a higher satisfaction baseline or circumstances that cause both happiness and success. Here, I 
draw on the multiplicity of comparison questions. I partition the sample into categories of 
people who have experienced different evolutions in different dimensions. The rationale is 
that a priori there is no general reason why some people should estimate that they have done 
better than their colleagues but worse than their former high school mates, or better then their 
parents but worse than in 1989. No obvious omitted variable or reverse causation is available 
for these concomitant opposite variations. 
More precisely, concerning the comparison questions, I group the possible answers in three 
groups: positive, negative and neutral (dropping the not applicable and don’t know 
modalities). Hence, for My household lives better nowadays than around 1989, I create three 
mutually exclusive dummy variables: livup, a dummy variable which takes value 1 for the 
modalities agree and strongly agree and 0 otherwise, livdown (a dummy which takes values 1 
for the modalities disagree and strongly disagree and 0 otherwise) and livstab (a dummy for 
the modality neither agree nor disagree). I proceed in the same way for the question I have 
done better in life than most of my high school mates, creating the dummy variables: 
schoolmatesup, schoolmatesdown and schoolmatestab. Identically, for the question I have 
done better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989, I create the dummy 
variables colleaguesup, colleaguesdown and colleaguestab, and for the question I have done 
better in life than my parents, I create the dummy variables parentsup, parentsdown and 
parentstab.
Concerning the 2006 income ladder question, I also create a series of dummy variables: 
lowrank a dummy variable which takes value 1 for people who position themselves under the 
5th step and 0 otherwise in 2006; averank: a dummy which takes value 1 for people who 
declare that they live on the 5th rung (23% of the sample) and highrank, a dummy which 
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takes value 1 if the respondent declares that he stands higher than the 5th step in 2006. 
Finally, I create a series of dummy variables indicating the difference between one’s self-
ranking on the 2006 scale and on the 1989 scale. Hence, rankup is a dummy variable which 
takes value 1 if the self-declared rank in 2006 is strictly superior to the subjective rank around
1989, rankdown indicates whether the self-declared rank is strictly inferior in 2006 as 
compared to 1989, and rankstab whether the respondents chooses the same step on the 2006 
and 1989 income ladders.
I map the different modalities of each pair of variables, creating a series of interaction terms 
that constitute a total partition of the sample. I then estimate Life Satisfaction on these 
interaction categories, controlling for the usual socio-demographic variables and for country 
dummies. 
Obviously, mapping the three modalities of each question, pair-wise, creates a set of nine
possible pairs of answers. I include all of them in the regression of satisfaction, choosing as 
the omitted category the “neutral_neutral” interaction, i.e. all the relevant pair of elements in 
the set of averank, rankstab, livstab, schoolmatestab, colleaguestab and parentsab. Hence the 
effect of interacted comparisons is evaluated against the omitted category constituted by the 
group of individuals who declare that their living standard has remained stable, or that their 
subjective rank on a social ladder is 5, or that they have succeeded in life just as well as their 
former colleagues, schoolmates or parents.
My interest lies with the interaction between opposite statements. I interpret their coefficient 
as a measure of their relative welfare impact, i.e. the net effect of opposite forces. For 
instance, the coefficient on the interaction variable lowrank_livup captures the effect of 
belonging to the lower part of the subjective economic ladder but living better as compared to 
1989. The coefficient on colleaguesup_schoolmatesdown is associated to those people who 
declare that have made better in life than their former colleagues, but worse than their former 
schoolmates. The question is which variables are the most important, i.e. have the highest 
power in terms of explaining the variance of life satisfaction. Hence, in the tables, I only 
report two of the nine interaction terms.
Of course, the interactions between opposed attitudes create unequal groups, as people who 
estimate that they have done well in one dimension, say compared to their parents, most often 
also judge that they have gone up along other dimensions, say colleagues. The categories of 
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interest include from 2% of the sample (colleaguesup_schoolmatesdown) to 27% 
(lowrank_parentsup), i.e. between 200 and 3000 observations (see Table A9 in the Appendix).
The focus of this paper is on the welfare effect of cognitive perceptions, not on the impact of 
objective income, hence in all regressions, I systematically control for the objective level of 
household consumption, which is the best indicator of affluence available in the data. I also 
include the usual socio-demographic controls, namely age, age square, gender, size of the 
household, children, education dummies, occupation dummies, industry dummies, 
employment relation dummies (employee/wage earner/ independent farmer/ unemployed) and
type of firm dummies (private/public/foreign). Because the way respondents answer 
subjective questions can be influenced by cultural traits, which differ across nations, I control 
for country dummies. I cluster by country so as to adjust standard errors for intra-country 
correlations. 
Finally, I also look at the impact of comparisons on the self-declared demand for income 
redistribution. Redistribution is a measure meant to correct the whole spectrum of income, not 
just the gap between my income and some other people’s income. Hence, one might expect 
that the demand for redistribution will be more dependent on one’s subjective ranking on a 
general economic ladder than on the more local comparisons to former schoolmates or 
colleagues.
Using subjective questions
In the prime infancy of the happiness literature, a discussion unavoidably had to be dedicated 
to the legitimacy of using subjective variables, to the justification of departing from the 
action-revealed method and to the reliability, the robustness and the meaningfulness of 
subjective variables, based on cross-ratings, neuro-psychological experiments and other tests 
of validity. With the accumulation of such arguments through time, readers have become 
accustomed to the use of subjective data and the literature has gained its lettres de noblesse in
the best international economic journals. I leave it to the surveys by Frey and Stutzer (2002),  
Kahneman and Krueger (2006) or Clark, Frijters and Shields (2008) to persuade the reader 
about the reliability of subjective questions.
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4. Results
As this is one of the very first surveys asking directly questions about comparisons, it is worth 
verifying whether these questions are relevant. To be sure, the survey does not ask directly 
“do you often compare yourself to your former schoolmates” or “how important is it to you to 
compare with your former colleagues”. However, respondents can choose to declare that they
“don’t know” whether they have done better in life than the indicated group. It is thus 
interesting to look at the proportion of people (of at least 40 years old) who choose this 
modality. 
It turns out that about 16% of respondents don’t know whether they have “done better in life 
than most of their former high school classmates”; 13% of respondents don’t know whether 
they have outpaced their 1989’s colleagues; 4 % choose this modality for the comparison with 
their parents; 2% for the comparison of their living standard to their 1989 level (and 2% for 
the life satisfaction question). Concerning the self-ranking questions, only 1% of respondents 
“don’t know” where they stand on a subjective economic ladder, and 2% where they used to 
stand back in 1989. Given the large changes undergone by the economy and the society 
during the considered period, these figures are quite impressive. To appreciate them, note that 
6% of respondents “don’t know” what one’s father’s profession was. I checked that these
orders of magnitudes are quite stable across countries. Further analysis showed that 
respondents who choose the “don’t know” modality are slightly older and poorer, more often 
women, less educated and more often independent, especially independent farmers. I refer to 
the working paper version if this paper for the corresponding tables.
4.1 Comparisons are important… and asymmetric
The fact that comparison questions are relevant does not necessarily mean that they are 
important to people. In order to assess the actual impact of comparisons, I now regress life 
satisfaction over each of the concerned variables. I start with a simple regression of life 
satisfaction in order to verify that the structure of satisfaction estimates is standard with 
respect to the usual correlates of individual well-being (see for example Di Tella et al., 2003). 
As expected (Table A1 in the Appendix), we observe a U shaped relationship between age 
and satisfaction, and a positive correlation with real household expenditure and education. 
Men are slightly happier than women, a frequent observation in Central and Eastern Europe 
and in Latin America, as opposed to Western Europe and the United States (Graham and 
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Pettinato, 2002; Guriev and Zhuravskaya, 2007; Easterlin, 2009; Grosfeld and Senik, 2008, 
Caporale et al., 2009). Life satisfaction increases with the number of adults and children in the 
household. Being in paid employment (whether in a private or state firm) is a source of higher 
satisfaction.
Table 1 shows that comparison questions have quite an important explanatory power in the 
regression of life satisfaction. Comparing favorably to other groups or ranking high on the 
social ladder has a positive impact on individual life satisfaction. Conversely, unfavorable 
comparisons have a significantly negative impact on life satisfaction. A 1% move on the scale 
of comparison questions induces about one third percentage point variation on the life 
satisfaction scale. The welfare effect of income comparison is larger than that of log 
household expenditure. Actually, introducing comparison questions in the estimates reduces 
the coefficient on log real household expenditure from 0.27 (Table A1) to lower values 
ranging from 0.14 to 0.18. This suggests that up to one third of the satisfaction stemming 
from consumption could be due not to actual consumption but to the representation of one’s 
living standard as an achievement.
Regressing life satisfaction over one comparison variable runs into the risk of capturing 
different effects in the same time: both the effect of the subjective comparisons and the effect 
of individuals’ objective current situation. Controlling for the level of household expenditure 
may attenuate the problem, but is not sufficient, as the effect of income comparisons is likely 
to differ from one income group to another. One way of controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity is to consider people whose situation in 1989 was comparable. I use the 1989 
ten-step ladder question in order to addresses the following question: conditional on declaring 
that around 1989 they stood on the 5th rung in terms of income (which is the case of 21% of 
the sample), how do comparisons affect people? In Table 1, the regressions are run both on 
the whole sample (column1) and on the sub-sample of people who used to stand on the 5th
rung of the 1989 economic scale (column 2). The results are qualitatively identical for both 
populations. 
Table 1 about here
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Table 1 shows that respondents who declare that they used to belong to the upper part of the 
economic ladder in 1989 report lower levels of life satisfaction (column 1). This can be 
interpreted in terms of adaptation or higher aspirations. Of course, at this stage, one cannot 
rule out the reverse causation interpretation, according to which less happy people in 2006 
tend to form an ideal image their past economic situation.
A striking result of Table 1 is the asymmetry in the effect of comparisons; namely when 
comparisons are unfavorable, this has a more important (negative) impact on life satisfaction
than when comparisons are favorable. Descending the ranks of the subjective ten-step ladder 
between 1989 and 2006 (rankdown) has a larger impact than going up (rankup). Judging that 
my living standard has deteriorated since 1989 (livdown) has a stronger effect (in absolute 
value) than feeling that it has improved (livup). Assessing that I have made worse in life than 
my former school mates (schoolmatesdown) has a stronger effect than having succeeded
better (schoolmatesup); the same is true as concerns comparison of my life trajectory with that 
my colleagues (colleaguesup/colleaguesdown) or my parents (parentsup/parentsdown).
This asymmetry can be interpreted as an illustration of the loss-aversion phenomenon 
suggested by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). It could also reflect the fact that the downside 
risk is more important than the upside risk in countries under review. As the questions are 
qualitative, there is no means to control for this. However, the general macroeconomic trends 
of the region do not particularly support this assumption. All the countries in the survey have 
experienced large GDP fluctuations between 1989 and 2006, with an initial stage of output 
fall, followed by a strong resumption of growth; the context is also different for the various 
countries of the sample which includes new members of the European Union aside with CIS 
countries (see for example, EBRD, 2006). However, the degree of loss aversion may be
particularly high in the context of transition, which involves a higher degree of general 
uncertainty; this would make the results difficult to generalize.
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4.2 Which comparisons matter more?
I now turn to the “horse race” between comparison benchmarks, identifying categories of 
people who have gone up in one dimension but down in another one, i.e. who have undergone 
different shocks2 in different dimensions. I estimate life satisfaction on these interacted 
categories, keeping the same controls as in the previous estimates.
In the following tables, I display only two out of the nine interactions between each pair of 
variables. The sign of the coefficient is usually significantly positive for the “stable-up” and 
“up-up” and negative for the “stable-down” and “down-down” interactions3. 
Local comparisons outweigh general ranking
In a recent paper, Brown, Gardner, Oswald and Qian (2008) have shown that individual 
satisfaction and well-being is influenced not just by relative income but by the rank-ordered 
position of one’s wage within a comparison set. Their results relate to intra-firm comparisons. 
Does this observation hold as concerns rankings in the general social ladder?
Table 2 does not validate this assumption. Panel A in Table 2 shows that local comparisons to 
parents, colleagues and former schoolmates are significantly more important than general 
social ranking. The sign of the coefficient on the interaction is always determined by the 
former rather than by the latter. Outperforming one’s former colleagues or one’s former living 
standard seems to be a more important element of satisfaction than ranking in the lower or in 
the upper part of the economic scale. 
Concerning the subjective evolution of one’s position on the social ladder, the observation is 
identical. Panel B of Table 2 shows that the negative effect of being outperformed by local 
competitors (schoolmatesdown, colleaguesdown, parentsdown) is more important than the 
impact of moving up on the social ladder (rankup): the coefficient on the interaction is either 
                                                
2 Transition implies that an unusually large part of citizens’s trajectory is due to exogenous shocks.
3 The entire regressions are available to any interested reader.
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negative or non significant. Conversely, the adverse effect of downward mobility on the 
social ladder (rankdown) seems to be offset by a favorable comparison with local reference 
groups; it is never strong enough to attract a significantly negative coefficient.
The predominant influence of internal benchmarks
Another very clear result is that the evolution in one’s standard of living, as compared to 15 
years ago, has a more important welfare effect than any other comparisons (Panel C of Table 
2). It dominates the change in one’s relative ranking as well as comparisons to local external 
benchmarks such as one’s former colleagues, classmates or parents. The interaction of livup 
with any other unfavorable comparison always attracts a significantly positive coefficient. 
Conversely, a deterioration in one’s living standard as compared to 1989 (livdown) always 
significantly dominates any other favorable local comparison. 
The primacy of one’s own trajectory could stem from the fact that people have a more 
accurate idea about the evolution in their own standard of living than about the other 
evolutions that they are asked to evaluate. As sensible as this seems, this is not consistent with 
the proportion of “don’t know” answers to those questions (see section 4, first paragraph); it 
also does not explain the asymmetric effect of comparisons. 
Amongst local “external” comparators, which are the most important determinants of 
subjective well-being: schoolmates, colleagues or parents? The estimates (Panel D of Table 2)
do not produce clear-cut results. The only significant interactions are between parents on the 
one hand and former colleagues or schoolmates on the other hand: former colleagues and 
schoolmates seem to be reference groups of similar importance, outweighing one’s parents.
Table 2 about here
The main lesson of Table 2 is that one’s own income trajectory matters more than any other 
comparison benchmark. The feeling of decading is an inconsolable pain, even for respondents 
who outperformed their former colleagues, schoolmates or parents. 
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4.3 Comparisons and the demand for redistribution
Income gaps seem to exert a sizeable impact on subjective well-being. Is this associated with 
a demand for income redistribution? 
Table 3 shows that the agreement with the statement that “The gap between the rich and the 
poor today in this country should be reduced” is influenced by income comparisons. 
Favorable comparisons are related to a significantly lower demand for redistribution whereas 
unfavorable ones are associated with a significantly higher demand for income redistribution.
The demand for redistribution thus seems to be consistent with the welfare effects of 
comparisons.
However, income redistribution is meant to correct the whole social spectrum of income, not 
just the gap between my income and some other people’s income. Hence, one could expect 
the demand for redistribution to be more dependent on the subjective income ladder than on 
subjective local comparisons to former schoolmates or colleagues. This prediction is 
confirmed by Table 3. Subjective ranking appears to be a significant determinant of the 
demand for income redistribution, whereas among local comparison benchmarks, only parents 
and one’s own past living standard are.
Concerning interactions, the effects are essentially similar. Panel A of Table 4 illustrates the 
predominance of subjective ranking (highrank, lowrank) over more local comparisons. Panel 
B of Table 4 shows that going down in the economic ladder (rankdown) significantly 
increases the preference for income redistribution. All other interactions between local 
benchmarks attract a non significant or positive coefficient. This is the case of interactions 
that includes comparisons to one’s former standard of living (Panel C of Table 4) or one’s 
parents (Panel D). Hence, unfavorable local comparisons always dominate favorable ones. 
Going down in any dimension seems to be a sufficient motive of the demand for 
redistribution, without any clear hierarchy between local benchmarks. This last observation, 
again, can be interpreted as a sign of loss aversion.
In summary, income comparisons seem to influence the demand for redistribution based on 
self-centered motives, as people express a higher demand for redistribution when they declare 
that they fare worse than their comparison benchmarks. Social ranking is the primary motive 
of the preference for income redistribution. Local comparisons exert a weak impact on the 
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demand for redistribution. Compared to the omitted category, people who experience any 
unfavorable comparison are more in favor of income-equalizing measures. 
4.4 Robustness of findings
This section examines whether the results are robust to other specifications of the estimates.
As a first robustness test, I have run all the regressions on the entire sample of people aged 
over 40, without the restriction that respondent A = respondent B (see section 2); the results 
were qualitatively identical. Second, as the results could be influenced by the fact that 58% of 
the restricted sample is made of people who were not in paid work at the time of the survey, I 
ran all the estimations on the sub-sample of respondents who were in paid work in 2006. 
Again, the results were qualitatively similar4. 
Third, for simplicity, I chose to present OLS estimates in the text, where the coefficients are 
directly interpretable in terms of elasticity. However, this interpretation is based on the 
assumption that the answers scale is taken as continuous by respondents. In order to give 
more generality to the results, I ran all the regressions with an ordered probit specification and 
a logit specification (after collapsing the answers into two modalities5); the results remained 
qualitatively unchanged. As an illustration, Table A1 in the Appendix presents the results of 
both an ordered probit and an OLS estimate of Life Satisfaction: the coefficients on all 
explanatory variables are extremely similar. Table A2 presents an ordered probit estimate of 
Life Satisfaction including comparison benchmarks: the latter are statistically significant, with 
similar coefficients as in the OLS specification presented in Table 1 (column 1).
Fourth, in order to explore the possible heterogeneity in the perception of income gaps, I 
partitioned the sample into three equal size percentiles in terms of real household 
consumption, i.e. the third poorest, the third richest and the remaining tier of the sample. 
                                                
4 For space constaints, they are not included in the text, but are available to any interested reader.
5 For space constaints, the logit estimates are not included in the text, but are available to any interested reader.
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Table A3 in the Appendix shows that the coefficients on comparisons benchmarks do not vary 
much across consumption percentiles. The main differences are that (i) subjective ranking in 
1989 has a lower negative impact on welfare for the poorest percentile and (ii) the coefficient 
on highrank is not significant in the regression on the poorest percentile, although the number 
of observations is not negligible (510). 
Finally, local comparisons could be more or less influent depending on the integration of the 
considered countries into the world market. Amongst the concerned countries, most countries
of Central and Eastern Europe have now entered the European Union; two of them have gone 
as far as adopting the Euro as their national currency (Montenegro and Slovenia). One could 
expect that these new members of the European Union are more integrated into the rest of the 
world, hence less sensitive to local comparisons. However, Table A4 in the Appendix shows 
that there is no difference in the impact of comparisons whether respondents are citizens of 
the European Union, the Community of Independent States (CIS) or Former Yugoslavia.
5. General conclusions
Income comparisons do seem to exert an impact on subjective well-being per se. “Internal 
benchmarks” created by one’s own trajectory are the most powerful. This does not mean that 
external benchmarks are not important; local comparison to precise groups of people prove to 
be more influential than self-ranking on an economic ladder. Comparisons to former 
schoolmates and colleagues are also more important than comparison to one’s parents. The 
analysis also provides pervasive evidence of loss aversion. Unfavorable comparisons are 
always more powerful, in terms of welfare effect, than positive ones.
The welfare impact of comparisons is associated with a consistent demand for redistribution
in the sense that unfavorable comparisons, which reduce life satisfaction, also call for higher 
income redistribution (and conversely).  However, the demand for redistribution is essentially 
associated with social ranking, rather than with local comparison benchmarks.
The two main results, i.e. the power of comparisons to one’s own past level of income and 
loss aversion, can be interpreted as manifestations of adaptation. Models of habituation with 
adjustment costs are consistent with the stronger effect of a reduction in consumption as 
compared to an increase. Indeed, with adaptation, the welfare effect of an increase in one’s 
income partly “evaporates” due to the “preference drift”, whereas the welfare effect of a 
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decrease in income is magnified: individuals then suffer not only from the reduced 
consumption due to the fall in their income but also from the adjustment in the level of 
aspirations.
The higher welfare impact of one’s own trajectory and of the reference groups formed by 
former schoolmates and colleagues can be interpreted as the effect lost or seized 
opportunities. What is painful is to have done worse than people who were like you at some 
point. This is much more important than moving along the general economic ladder. People 
suffer less from going down in the social hierarchy if all their former peers share the same 
fate. But they hate under-performing their former companions. This may be because reference 
groups represent some virtual, potential achievement. In summary, the idea would be that 
comparisons hurt not so much because of relative deprivation but rather because people care 
about having seized their opportunities.
The fact that local comparisons have a higher impact on subjective well-being, whereas the 
demand for income redistribution is mostly responsive to social ranking bears policy 
implications. Aversion to inequality should not be confused with relative utility. People suffer 
from relative deprivation rather than from general income inequality. They especially dislike 
experiencing a decline in their living standard. But this does not turn them in favor of income 
equalization. Hence, offering people the opportunity to improve their own situation and 
achieve their projects could be more welfare improving than narrowing the income ladder.
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Table 1. The Explanatory Power of Comparison Questions.  OLS estimates of Life Satisfaction 
 
  
  
Whole sample 
  
Rank 5 in 1989 
  
 1 2 3 4 
  Coef. and std. err. Obs. and R2 Coef. and std. err. Obs. and R2 
Econrank1989 -0.041*** 11395    
  [0.006] 0.196    
Econrank2006 0.218*** 11523 0.268*** 2430 
  [0.010] 0.280 [0.022] 0.321 
Highrank 0.180*** 11523 0.180** 2430 
  [0.031] 0.252 [0.070] 0.301 
Lowrank -0.537***   -0.739***   
  [0.030]   [0.047]   
Rankup 0.270*** 11365 0.180** 2430 
  [0.041] 0.245 [0.070] 0.301 
Rankdown -0.437***   -0.739***   
  [0.037]   [0.047]   
Livup 0.491*** 11357 0.415*** 2385 
  [0.036] 0.362 [0.065] 0.376 
Livdown -0.698***   -0.776***   
  [0.035]   [0.068]   
Colleaugesup 0.398*** 9615 0.513*** 2012 
  [0.037] 0.282 [0.061] 0.317 
Colleaguesdown -0.565***   -0.553***   
  [0.027]   [0.050]   
Schoolmatesup 0.443*** 9434 0.474*** 1979 
  [0.035] 0.281 [0.052] 0.309 
Schoolmatesdown -0.528***   -0.519***   
  [0.023]   [0.042]   
Parentsup 0.379*** 11079 0.436*** 2316 
  [0.027] 0.265 [0.046] 0.293 
Parentsdown -0.448***   -0.446***   
  [0.034]   [0.063]   
 
Notes to Table 1: 
Sub-sample of respondents aged over 40 and where respondent A = respondent B. 
Controls: number of adults in household, number of children in household, age, gender, employment status of first 
job (wage-earner/independent/ self-employed), dummies for state/private/foreign ownership of firm of first job, 
highest educational degree obtained, type of industry of first job, ever been member of Communist party, country 
dummies. 
All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by country.* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%.  
Econrank1989: subjective economic rank around 1989; econrank2006: subjective economic rank in 2006. 
Highrank: declared rank in 2006 >5 (out of 10 rungs); lowrank: declared rank in 2006 <5; averank2006: declared 
rank in 2006=5. 
Rankup: rank in 2006> rank in 1989; rankdown: rank in 2006< rank in 1989; rankstab: rank in 2006=rank in 
1989. 
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Schoolmatesup: dummy for the modalities “agree” and “strongly agree” with the statement “I have done better in 
life than most of my high school mates”.  
Matedown: dummy for the modalities “disagree” and “strongly disagree” with the statement “I have done better 
in life than most of my high school mates”.  
Colleaguesup: dummy for the modalities “agree” and “strongly agree” with the statement “I have done better in 
life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989”». 
Colleaguesdown: dummy for the modalities “disagree” and “strongly disagree” with the statement “I have done 
better in life than most of my colleagues I had around 1989”». 
Parentsup: dummy for the modalities “agree” and “strongly agree” with the statement “I have done better in life 
than my parents”. 
Parentsdown: dummy for the modalities “disagree” and “strongly disagree” with the statement “I have done better 
in life than my parents”. 
Livup: dummy for the modalities “agree” and “strongly agree” with the statement “My household lives better 
nowadays than around 1989”.   
Livdown: dummy for the modalities “disagree” and “strongly disagree” with the statement “My household lives 
better nowadays than around 1989”.   
Livstab, matesstab, colleaguestab and parentsstab are dummies for the modality “neither agree nor disagree” with 
the aforementioned statements. 
Omitted categories: averank2006 (rank=5 in 2006) for columns 8 and 9, resp. livstab, rankstab, schoolmatestab, 
parentstab, colleaguestab for columns 4-5 and 8-15. 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard 
errors in parenthesis (columns 1 and 3), as well as the number of no  missing observations and R2 of the 
regression (columns 2 and 4). 
Columns 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13 and 15: Sub-sample of respondents who declare that in 1989 they stood on the fifth 
rung of a subjective 10 steps economic ladder. 
Example: one percent increase on the 2006 social rank brings about 0.218% increase on the subjective life 
satisfaction scale (first column, second row). 
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Table 2. The Relative Power of Comparison Benchmarks. OLS Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
 
Panel A 1 2 Panel C 5 6 
 Coef. Obs. and R2  Coef. Obs. and R2 
Highrank_livdown -0.511*** 11256 Livup_rankdown 0.333*** 11158 
  [0.075] 0.384   [0.050] 0.364 
Lowrank_livup 0.164***   Livdown_rankup -0.514***   
  [0.042]     [0.071]   
Highrank_schoolmatesdown -0.387*** 9358 Livupmates_down 0.181*** 9258 
  [0.068] 0.316   [0.043] 0.403 
Lowrank_schoolmatesup -0.018   Livdown_schoolmatesupp -0.282***   
  [0.045]     [0.063]   
Highrank_colleaguesdown -0.130 9541 Livup_colleaguesdown 0.169*** 9468 
  [0.086] 0.319   [0.057] 0.403 
Lowrank_colleaguesup 0.318***   Livdown_colleaguesup -0.390***   
  [0.063]     [0.058]   
Highrank_parentsdown -0.292*** 10972 Livup_parentsdown 0.325*** 10860 
  [0.092] 0.307   [0.079] 0.391 
Lowrank_parentsup -0.149***   Livdown_parentsup -0.311***   
  [0.051]     [0.051]   
            
Panel B 3 4 Panel D 7 8 
 Coef. Obs. and R2  Coef. Obs. and R2 
Rankup_schoolmatesdown 0.141 10823 Schoolmatesup_parentsdown 0.054 11639 
  [0.087] 0.305   [0.092] 0.191 
Rankdown_schoolmatesup 0.279***   Schoolmatesdown_parentsup -0.073*   
  [0.034]     [0.037]   
Rankup_colleaguesdown -0.250*** 9425 Colleaguesup_schoolmatesdown -0.061 11158 
  [0.082] 0.319   [0.079] 0.364 
Rankdown_colleaguesup -0.078   Colleaguesdown_schoolmatesup -0.075   
  [0.056]     [0.069]   
Rankup_parentsdown -0.204* 9235 Colleaguesup_parentsdown 0.023 9258 
  [0.104] 0.194  [0.095] 0.403 
Rankdown_parentsup -0.052   Colleaguesdown_parentsup -0.107**   
  [0.065]         
The table only displays the interaction between opposite attitudes, but all the interactions are included. The 
omitted category is “neutral_neutral”, i.e. averank_livstab, averank_matestab, averank_colleaguestab, 
averank_parentstab (panel A), rankstab_matestab, rankstab_colleaguestab, rankstab_parentstab (panel B), 
livstab_rankstab, livstab_matestab, livstab_colleaguestab, livstab_parentsstab (panel C), matestab_parentstab, 
colleaguestab_matestab and colleaguestab_parentstab (panel D). 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard 
errors in parenthesis, as well as the number of non missing observations and R2 of the regression. 
Other controls and notes: same as Table 1. 
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Table 3. The Demand for Income Distribution and Comparisons 
OLS Estimates of the Demand for Redistribution 
  -1 -2 
  Coefficients and std.errors Observations and R2 
Econrank1989 0.013** 11197 
  [0.005] 0.061 
Econrank2006 -0.053*** 11322 
  [0.009] 0.070 
Highrank -0.152*** 11322 
  [0.033] 0.069 
Lowrank 0.076***   
  [0.025]   
Rankup -0.042 11164 
  [0.040] 0.069 
Rankdown 0.154***   
  [0.028]   
Livup 0.004 11155 
  [0.028] 0.066 
Livdown 0.152***   
  [0.024]   
Schoolmatesup 0.007 9303 
  [0.030] 0.060 
Schoolmatesdown 0.039   
  [0.031]   
Colleaguesup -0.019 9472 
  [0.031] 0.062 
Colleaguesdown 0.033   
  [0.034]   
Parentsup 0.127*** 10908 
  [0.028] 0.064 
Parentsdown 0.039   
  [0.029]   
Controls and notes: same as Table 2. 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the 
regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis, as well as the 
number of non missing observations of the regression. 
The estimated variable is the answer to the question whether “The gap 
between the rich and the poor should be reduced”. Possible answers were 
strongly disagree/ disagree/ neither agree nor disagree/ agree/ strongly 
agree, coded from 1 to 5 in ascending order.  
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Table 4. The Relative Impact of Different Comparison Benchmarks on the Demand for Redistribution 
OLS Estimates of the Demand for Redistribution 
Panel A 1 2 Panel C 5 6 
  Coef. Obs. and R2   Coef. Obs. and R2 
Highrank_livdown -0.036 14595 Livup_schoolmatesdown 0.190*** 12338 
  [0.052] 0.065   [0.050] 0.059 
Lowrank_livup 0.102**   Livdown_schoolmatesupp 0.275***   
  [0.045]     [0.043]   
Highrank_schoolmatesdown -0.243*** 13406 Livup_parentsdown 0.255*** 14097 
  [0.065] 0.061   [0.064] 0.066 
Lowrank_schoolmatesup 0.050   Livdown_parentsup 0.384***   
  [0.035]     [0.050]   
Highrank_colleaguesdown -0.179** 11988 Livup_colleaguesdown 0.143*** 11677 
  [0.067] 0.065   [0.051] 0.064 
Lowrank_colleaguesup 0.093   Livdown_colleaguesup 0.245***   
  [0.064]     [0.040]   
Highrank_parentsdown -0.102 15286     
  [0.061] 0.066     
Lowrank_parentsup 0.229***       
  [0.050]       
            
Panel B 3 4 Panel D 7 8 
  Coef. Obs. and R2   Coef. Obs. and R2 
Rankup_parentsdown -0.007 14072 Collup_matesdown -0.014 11133 
  [0.091] 0.067   [0.088] 0.057 
Rankdown_parentsup 0.285***   Colldown_matesup 0.033   
  [0.043]     [0.085]   
Rankup_livdown -0.112 12338 Collup_parentsdown 0.184*** 11815 
  [0.070] 0.059   [0.049] 0.068 
Rankdown_livup 0.069*   Colldown_parentsup 0.309***   
  [0.040]     [0.047]   
Rankup_matesdown -0.096 12320 Matesup_parentsdown 0.126* 13131 
  [0.079] 0.055   [0.064] 0.060 
Rankdown_matesup 0.085***   Matesdown_parentsup 0.266***   
  [0.025]     [0.050]   
Rankup_colldown -0.021 11570     
  [0.078] 0.065     
Rankdown_collup 0.134***       
  [0.043]         
Controls and notes: same as Table 2. 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard errors in 
parenthesis, as well as the number of non missing observations and R2 of the regression. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Basic Regressions of Life Satisfaction, OLS and Ordered Probit Estimates 
 -1 -2 
 OLS Ordered probit 
Log real household expenditure 0.266*** 0.271*** 
 [0.018] [0.018] 
Age -0.048*** -0.048*** 
 [0.004] [0.004] 
Age square 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Male 0.041 0.047* 
 [0.025] [0.025] 
# adults 14 yrs and older 0.068*** 0.071*** 
 [0.009] [0.010] 
# children less than 14 yrs 0.038** 0.038*** 
 [0.014] [0.014] 
Private firm 0.145* 0.153* 
 [0.076] [0.080] 
State firm 0.147* 0.146* 
 [0.075] [0.080] 
Foreign firm 0.120 0.138 
 [0.088] [0.092] 
Wage-earner -0.272 -0.299 
 [0.183] [0.184] 
Self-employed 0.049 0.050 
 [0.155] [0.157] 
Independent farmer 0.031 0.010 
 [0.213] [0.217] 
Compulsory education -0.006 -0.013 
 [0.049] [0.050] 
Secondary education 0.160*** 0.158*** 
 [0.057] [0.058] 
Professional training 0.098* 0.092* 
 [0.050] [0.051] 
University 0.325*** 0.325*** 
 [0.063] [0.062] 
Post-graduate 0.514*** 0.556*** 
 [0.090] [0.095] 
Constant 1.942***  
 [0.133]  
Observations 16570 16570 
R-squared 0.198  
 
Omitted categories: not in paid employment/no education. Country dummies and industry dummies included. 
Sub-sample of respondents aged over 40 and where respondent A = respondent B. 
All standard errors (in brackets) are clustered by country. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** 
significant at 1%.  
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Table A2. Ordered Probit Estimates of Life Satisfaction Including Comparison Benchmarks 
  -1 -2 
     
 Coef. Observations 
Econrank1989 -0.041*** 11395 
  [0.006]   
Econrank2006 0.236*** 
 
11523 
  [0.012]   
Highrank 0.214*** 11523 
  [0.039]   
Lowrank -0.551***   
  [0.030]   
Rankup 0.306*** 11365 
  [0.044]   
Rankdown -0.449***   
  [0.037]   
Livup 0.612*** 11357 
  [0.045]   
Livdown -0.743***   
  [0.038]   
Colleaguesup 0.453*** 9615 
  [0.043]   
Colleaguesdown -0.577***   
  [0.031]   
Schoolmatesup 0.499*** 9434 
  [0.042]   
Schoolmatesdown -0.540***   
  [0.027]   
Parentsup 0.407*** 11079 
  [0.033]   
Parentsdown -0.460***   
  [0.039]   
Controls and notes: same as Table 1. 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression 
coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis, as well as the number of non missing 
observations. 
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Table A3. Life Satisfaction and Comparisons, by Percentiles of Real Household Consumption 
OLS estimates of Life Satisfaction 
  1 2 3 
  Poor Middle Rich 
        
Econrank2006 0.224*** 0.208*** 0.225*** 
  [0.014] [0.012] [0.018] 
Observations 4729 3721 3073 
R-squared 0.280 0.252 0.270 
Econrank1989 -0.020* -0.058*** -0.054*** 
  [0.011] [0.011] [0.010] 
Observations 4679 3674 3042 
R-squared 0.187 0.181 0.183 
Highrank 0.040 0.190*** 0.298*** 
  [0.078] [0.041] [0.046] 
Lowrank -0.671*** -0.459*** -0.473*** 
  [0.052] [0.040] [0.050] 
Observations 4729 3721 3073 
R-squared 0.252 0.223 0.244 
Rankup 0.277*** 0.358*** 0.184** 
  [0.071] [0.063] [0.066] 
Rankdown -0.446*** -0.374*** -0.502*** 
  [0.045] [0.053] [0.066] 
Observations 4669 3663 3033 
R-squared 0.235 0.228 0.235 
Livup 0.500*** 0.525*** 0.465*** 
  [0.056] [0.036] [0.049] 
Livdown -0.754*** -0.634*** -0.678*** 
  [0.046] [0.055] [0.055] 
Observations 4671 3664 3022 
R-squared 0.365 0.340 0.346 
Colleaguesup 0.430*** 0.383*** 0.416*** 
  [0.063] [0.051] [0.046] 
Colleaguesdown -0.614*** -0.543*** -0.497*** 
  [0.039] [0.051] [0.044] 
Observations 3776 3142 2697 
R-squared 0.295 0.258 0.259 
Schoolmatesup 0.460*** 0.455*** 0.429*** 
  [0.072] [0.047] [0.042] 
Schoolmatesdown -0.550*** -0.497*** -0.534*** 
  [0.041] [0.040] [0.044] 
Observations 3657 3120 2657 
R-squared 0.279 0.262 0.259 
Parentsup 0.428*** 0.363*** 0.333*** 
  [0.044] [0.045] [0.050] 
Parentsdown -0.464*** -0.395*** -0.470*** 
  [0.049] [0.049] [0.061] 
Observations 4504 3600 2975 
R-squared 0.272 0.238 0.246 
Controls and notes: same as Table 1. Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate 
regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard errors in parenthesis, as well as 
the number of non missing observations and R2 of the regression. 
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Table A4 
Comparisons and Life Satisfaction, by Regions 
OLS Estimates of Life Satisfaction 
    
CIS 
 
European Union 
 
Former Yugoslavia 
 
    Coefficient 
 
Obs.and R2 Coefficient 
 
Obs.and R2 Coefficient 
 
Obs.and R2 
Econrank2006   0.222*** 6054 0.198*** 6932 0.263*** 2819 
    [0.015] 0.291 [0.017] 0.257 [0.021] 0.257 
Econrank1989   -0.036*** 5445 -0.042*** 6411 -0.041** 2676 
    [0.006] 0.200 [0.010] 0.185 [0.014] 0.138 
Livup   0.498*** 5376 0.467*** 6402 0.502*** 2654 
    [0.059] 0.365 [0.046] 0.346 [0.065] 0.310 
Livdown   -0.643***   -0.668***   -0.796***   
    [0.027]   [0.053]   [0.029]   
Schoolmatesup   0.468*** 4961 0.381*** 5808 0.429*** 2519 
    [0.062] 0.325 [0.035] 0.270 [0.089] 0.228 
Schoolmatesdown   -0.590***   -0.567***   -0.541***   
    [0.051]   [0.032]   [0.048]   
Colleaguesup   0.455*** 4132 0.335*** 5360 0.430*** 2334 
    [0.075] 0.313 [0.056] 0.265 [0.077] 0.238 
Colleaguesdown   -0.590***   -0.587***   -0.575***   
    [0.048]   [0.016]   [0.059]   
Parentsup  0.370*** 5681 0.331*** 6732 0.212** 2720 
   [0.042] 0.284 [0.052] 0.247 [0.049] 0.197 
Parentsdown  -0.485***   -0.453***   -0.499***   
    [0.033]   [0.061]   [0.075]   
Controls and notes: same as Table 1. 
Each cell of the table corresponds to a separate regression. It displays the regression coefficients and standard errors 
in parenthesis, as well as the number of non missing observations and R2 of the regression. 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
Sample restricted to respondents aged over 40, where respondent A=respondent B, and no observation is missing 
for the subjective comparison questions.  
 
 
Table A5.   Country Composition of the Sample 
 
 Observations 
weighted 
Percentage 
weighted 
   
Albania 420 3,3 
Armenia 374 3,0 
Azerbaijan 307 2,4 
Belarus 440 3,5 
Bosnia 418 3,3 
Bulgaria 600 4,7 
Croatia 567 4,5 
Czechrep 529 4,2 
Estonia 567 4,5 
Fyrom 395 3,1 
Georgia 488 3,9 
Hungary 614 4,8 
Kazakhstan 420 3,3 
Kyrgyzstan 349 2,8 
Latvia 569 4,5 
Lithuania 544 4,3 
Moldova 501 4,0 
Mongolia 269 2,1 
Montenegro 401 3,2 
Poland 455 3,6 
Romania 474 3,7 
Russia 489 3,9 
Serbia 430 3,4 
Slovakia 481 3,8 
Slovenia 485 3,8 
Tajikistan 308 2,4 
Ukraine 473 3,7 
Uzbekistan 321 2,5 
Total observations, unweighted 11876 100 
 
Weights (3rd column) correct for the national composition of the population but do not reconstitute the 
size of the different countries. 
 
Table A6.   Socio-Demographic Variables 
 
Variable Nb 
Observations
Mean 
weighted 
Std. Dev 
weighted 
Min Max 
      
Log real household expenditure 11842 7,4 0,9 1 10,2 
Nb Adults in household 11874 2,0 1,2 1 12 
Nb Children in household 11874 0,2 0,6 0 7 
Age 11874 58,6 11,8 41 97 
Gender  11874 0,5 0,5 0 1 
Page 35 of 37
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
 
34
 
 
Table A7.   Professional Variables 
 
 Freq.weighted Percent weighted 
Highest degree of education obtained   
   
Compulsory education 857 6,8 
Secondary education 2524 19,9 
Professional training 2638 20,8 
University 4095 32,3 
Post graduate 2453 19,4 
No education 112 0,9 
   
Employment status in primary job   
Unemployed 7295 57,7 
Employee 4297 34,0 
Self-employed 848 6,7 
Independent farmer 207 1,6 
 
Among employed people : 
   
State firm 1788 44 
Private firm 2274 56 
Foreign owned firm 180 4.4 
   
Type of industry of primary job   
   
Unemployed 7321 57,7 
Agriculture hunting and forestry 666 5,3 
Fishing fish farming 28 0,2 
Mining and quarrying 80 0,6 
Manufacturing 668 5,3 
Electricity gas and water supply 220 1,7 
Construction 505 4,0 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair 587 4,6 
Hotels and restaurants 137 1,1 
Transport communications 404 3,2 
Financial intermediation 89 0,7 
Real estate renting and business activities 62 0,5 
Public administration military social 367 2,9 
Education 613 4,8 
Health and health work 352 2,8 
Other community social and personal 
services 485 3,8 
Activities of households 90 0,7 
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 15 0,1 
 
Weigthed statistics. Weights correct for the national composition of the population 
but do not reconstitute the size of the different countries. 
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Table A8.   Subjective Variables 
 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
      
Life satisfaction 11672 2,93 1,16 1 5 
Econrank2006 11738 3,94 1,78 1 10 
Econrank1989 11608 5,57 2,13 1 10 
Livup 11478 0,27 0,44 0 1 
Livdown 11478 0,52 0,50 0 1 
Livstab 11478 0,21 0,41 0 1 
Highrank 11738 0,16 0,37 0 1 
Lowrank 11738 0,60 0,49 0 1 
Averank 11738 0,23 0,42 0 1 
Rankup 11574 0,16 0,37 0 1 
Rankdown 11574 0,65 0,48 0 1 
Rankstab 11574 0,19 0,40 0 1 
Matesup 9535 0,28 0,45 0 1 
Matesdown 9535 0,34 0,47 0 1 
Matestab 9535 0,37 0,48 0 1 
Collup 9724 0,26 0,44 0 1 
Colldown 9724 0,35 0,48 0 1 
Collstab 9724 0,39 0,49 0 1 
Parentsup 11207 0,52 0,50 0 1 
Parentsdown 11207 0,27 0,44 0 1 
Parentstab 11207 0,22 0,41 0 1 
Reduce inequality 16335 4,19 0,95 1 5 
 
Weighted statistics. Weights correct for the national composition of the population but 
do not reconstitute the size of the different countries. 
 
The mean value of these dummy variables indicates the proportion of respondents who 
chose the corresponding modality. 
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Table A9.    Interactions between Opposite Attitudes: proportion of observations 
 
Variable Observations Weighted 
freq. 
Mean Std Dev Min Max 
       
Highrank_schoolmatesdown 9456 10110 0,03 0,17 0 1 
Lowrank_schoolmatesup 9456 10110 0,11 0,32 0 1 
       
Highrank_colleaguesdown 9647 10375 0,03 0,18 0 1 
Lowrank_colleaguesup 9647 10375 0,11 0,31 0 1 
       
Highrank_parentsdown 11094 11828 0,03 0,16 0 1 
Lowrank_parentsup 11094 11828 0,27 0,44 0 1 
       
Highrank_livdown 11372 12127 0,05 0,22 0 1 
Lowrank_livup 11372 12127 0,11 0,31 0 1 
       
Livupschool_schoolmatesdown 9337 9968 0,04 0,21 0 1 
Livdownschool_schoolmatesup 9337 9968 0,10 0,29 0 1 
       
Livup_colleaguesdown 9556 10266 0,04 0,21 0 1 
Livdown_colleaguesup 9556 10266 0,08 0,28 0 1 
       
Livup_parentsdown 10969 11690 0,03 0,16 0 1 
Livdown_parrentsup 10969 11690 0,20 0,40 0 1 
       
Livup_rankdown 11272 12022 0,09 0,29 0 1 
Livdown_rankup 11272 12022 0,02 0,15 0 1 
       
Rankup_schoolmatesdown 9332 9968 0,03 0,18 0 1 
Rankdown_schoolmatesup 9332 9968 0,15 0,36 0 1 
       
Rankup_colleaguesdown 9531 10242 0,03 0,18 0 1 
Rankdown_colleaguesup 9531 10242 0,13 0,34 0 1 
       
Rankup_parentsdown 10944 11663 0,02 0,15 0 1 
Rankdown_parentsup 10944 11663 0,30 0,46 0 1 
       
Colleaguesup_parentsdown 9483 10189 0,03 0,17 0 1 
Colleaguesdown_parentsup 9483 10189 0,11 0,31 0 1 
       
Colleaguesup_schoolmatesdown 8843 9504 0,02 0,14 0 1 
Colleaguesdown_schoolmatesup 8843 9504 0,02 0,15 0 1 
       
Schoolmatesup_parentsdown 9280 9916 0,03 0,18 0 1 
Schoolmatesdown_parentsup 9280 9916 0,11 0,31 0 1 
 
Weighted statistics. Weights correct for the national composition of the population but do not reconstitute the size of 
the different countries. 
 
The mean value of these dummy variables indicates the proportion of respondents who chose the corresponding 
modality. 
